Forfeiture of Attorney\u27s Fees Under RICO and CCE by McCay, Frank
Fordham Law Review 
Volume 54 Issue 6 Article 7 
1986 
Forfeiture of Attorney's Fees Under RICO and CCE 
Frank McCay 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Frank McCay, Forfeiture of Attorney's Fees Under RICO and CCE, 54 Fordham L. Rev. 1171 (1986). 
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol54/iss6/7 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and 
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham 
Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu. 
FORFEITURE OF ATTORNEYS' FEES UNDER RICO AND CCE
INTRODUCTION
Recognizing that the war against organized crime required economic
weapons, Congress enacted, as part of the Racketeer Influenced and Cor-
rupt Organizations (RICO)l and Continuing Criminal Enterprise (CCE)2
statutes, in-personam 3 forfeiture penalties4 designed to strip criminal or-
ganizations of the proceeds of their crimes.5 The Comprehensive Crime
Control Act of 19846 closed some loopholes7 in the forfeiture statutes by
more clearly defining assets subject to forfeiture' and by adding a provi-
1. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, tit. IX, 84 Stat. 922,
941-48 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1961-68 (West 1984 & Supp. 1986)).
2. Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-
513, § 408, 84 Stat. 1236, 1265 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 848, 853 (West
Supp. 1986)).
3. The more common type of forfeiture, in rem forfeiture, is effected by a civil pro-
ceeding against unlawfully used property, which itself is considered the offender. See
United States v. United States Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. 715, 719 (1971); The Palmyra,
25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1, 14 (1827); United States v. L'Hoste, 609 F.2d 796, 813 n.15 (5th
Cir.), cerl denied, 449 U.S. 833 (1980). An example is the CCE civil forfeiture statute, 21
U.S.C.A. § 881 (West 1981 & Supp. 1986), which provides for forfeiture of controlled
substances, containers, conveyances, plant and equipment. Forfeiture in rem is not de-
pendent on an adjudication of personal guilt. See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leas-
ing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 683-84 (1974); United States v. The Ruth Mildred, 286 U.S. 67, 69
(1932).
In-personam forfeiture is a criminal penalty against an individual, and the scope of
forfeiture is determined by the defendant's criminal conduct. United States v. Ginsburg,
773 F.2d 798, 800-01 (7th Cir. 1985); L'Hoste, 609 F.2d at 813 n.15; see Hughes &
O'Connell, In Personam (Criminal) Forfeiture and Federal Drug Felonie. An Expansion
of a Harsh English Tradition into a Modern Dilemma, 11 Pepperdine L. Rev. 613, 617
(1984); Reed, Criminal Forfeiture Under the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 1984: Rais-
ing the Stakes, 22 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 747, 747-48 (1985). Since constitutional protections
afforded criminal defendants are implicated, procedures related to in-personam forfeiture
are subject to strict scrutiny. United States v. Lewis, 759 F.2d 1316, 1324 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 106 S. Ct. 406 (1985).
4. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1963 (West Supp. 1986); 21 U.S.C.A. § 853 (West Supp. 1986).
5. See S. Rep. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 80 (1969). These sentiments were
echoed in a report on the 1984 amendments. See S. Rep. No. 225, 98th Cong., Ist Sess.
191, reprinted in 1984 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 3182, 3374 [hereinafter cited as 1984
Senate Report]. Congress recognized that imprisoning members of the criminal organiza-
tion was not enough; an attack on the ecomomic base of the organization's power was
required. See Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 28 (1983); see also Organized Crime
Controk Hearings on S. 30 and Related Proposals Before Subcomm. No. 5 of House
Comm. on Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 107 (1970); S. Rep. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st
Sess. 78 (1969); 116 Cong. Rec. 591 (1970) (remarks of Sen. McClellan, a sponsor of
RICO).
6. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837 (1984).
7. The Senate Judiciary Committee wrote of the amendments: "This bill is intended
to eliminate the statutory limitations and ambiguities that have frustrated active pursuit
of forfeiture by Federal law enforcement agencies." 1984 Senate Report, supra note 5, at
192, reprinted in 1984 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 3375.
8. The new 18 U.S.C.A. § 1963(a)(3) (West Supp. 1986) and 21 U.S.C.A.
§ 853(a)(1) (West Supp. 1986) make clear that the forfeiture statutes reach "any property
constituting, or derived from, any proceeds" of criminal enterprises, not merely the de-
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sion whereby the government's title to forfeited property relates back to
the time of the illegal act.9 Subsequent transfers of the forfeitable prop-
erty are void unless made to a "bona fide purchaser for value."'"
The relation-back provisions have been the basis for the government's
controversial attempts to seize legal fees paid by RICO and CCE defend-
ants." This use of the forfeiture statutes raises serious right-to-counsel
questions. 2 While the ill-gotten gains become the property of the gov-
ernment upon commission of the illegal act, the determination that there
was an illegal act, and that the assets transferred are ill-gotten, does not
occur until a judgment of forfeiture. 3 Critics of the government's policy
argue that the threat of forfeiture makes it difficult for defendants to re-
tain effective counsel and thus infringes on the right guaranteed by the
sixth amendment. 4 The government counters that a defendant is not
entitled to defend himself using assets that may not belong to him."'
Part I of this Note examines whether the RICO and CCE forfeiture
statutes should be construed to apply to fees paid to attorneys and con-
cludes they should. Part II discusses the constitutional problems raised
by such a construction. Part III proposes as a solution to the constitu-
tional problems a pretrial hearing on the question of fee forfeiture, cou-
pled with an assured appointed-counsel fee.
I. APPLICATION OF THE FORFEITURE STATUTES
TO ATTORNEYS' FEES
Only five decisions have interpreted the amended forfeiture statutes as
fendant's investment in the enterprise. These sections codify the holding of Russello v.
United States, 464 U.S. 16, 28 (1983).
9. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1963(c) (West Supp. 1986); 21 U.S.C.A. § 853(c) (West Supp.
1986). That forfeiture relates back to the time the criminal act was committed is not a
novel notion. An implied relation-back feature has been found in in rem forfeiture stat-
utes. See United States v. Stowell, 133 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1890) ("forfeiture takes effect im-
mediately upon the commission of the act . . . and avoids all intermediate sales and
alienations, even to purchasers in good faith"); Ivers v. United States, 581 F.2d 1362,
1367 (9th Cir. 1978); Simons v. United States, 541 F.2d 1351, 1352 (9th Cir. 1976).
18 U.S.C.A. § 1963(m) (West Supp. 1986) and 21 U.S.C.A. § 853(n) (West Supp.
1986) provide for a post-conviction hearing at which third parties may challenge a judg-
ment of forfeiture pertaining to property transferred to them.
10. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1963(c) (West Supp. 1986); 21 U.S.C.A. § 853(c) (West Supp.
1986).
11. See United States v. Ianniello, No. S 85 Cr. 115, slip op. at 3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 3,
1985); Press, Using Fees as Evidence, Newsweek, Apr. 21, 1986, at 74, col. 2.
12. See infra Part II.
13. See Payden v. United States, 605 F. Supp. 839, 849 n.14 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd on
other grounds, 767 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1985); DePetris & Bachrach, Forfeiture ofAttorneys'
Fees-A Responsible Approach, N.Y.L.J., June 19, 1985, at 4, col. 3 [hereinafter cited as
DePetris & Bachrach].
14. See United States v. Badalamenti, 614 F. Supp. 194, 196-97 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
15. See Payden v. United States, 605 F. Supp. 839, 849 n.14 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd on
other grounds, 767 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1985).
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they relate to attorneys' fees. The court in Payden v. United States1 6 saw
no statutory or constitutional obstacle to fee forfeiture. The courts in
United States v. Reckmeyer," United States v. Ianniello,"s United States
v. Badalamenti19 and United States v. Rogers,20 grappling with an incon-
clusive legislative history, and straining to circumvent the plain language
of the statutes and concomitant constitutional problems, construed the
statutes as inapplicable to legitimately paid legal fees.2
The RICO and CCE forfeiture statutes contain identical relation-back
provisions under which "[a]l right, title, and interest in property [subject
to forfeiture] vests in the United States upon the commission of the act
giving rise to forfeiture."' The property may be forfeited to the govern-
ment even if it "is subsequently transferred to a person other than the
defendant. . . unless the transferee establishes. . . that he is a bona fide
purchaser for value. . . who at the time of purchase was reasonably
without cause to believe that the property was subject to forfeiture."'
There is little doubt that an attorney pays value by agreeing to render
services and thus satisfies the first requisite of the bona fide purchaser
exception.24 The crucial question, according to United States v. Rogers,2
is the meaning of the requirement that the transferee be "reasonably
without cause to believe that the property was subject to forfeiture. '26
Employing perplexing logic, the court found this requirement ambigu-
ous because the statutes do not specify what particular assets in the
hands of transferees are subject to forfeiture.2 The Rogers court inferred
from the structure of the statutes that Congress intended that assets
transferred to third parties be treated differently from assets in the hands
of the defendant.28 Unfortunately, observed the court, the statutes do
16. Id. The Payden decision involved fee forfeiture as justification for a subpoena
addressed to an attorney. See id. at 843.
17. No. Cr. 85-00010-A, slip op. (E.D. Va. Mar. 27, 1986).
18. No. S 85 Cr. 115, slip op. (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 3, 1985).
19. 614 F. Supp. 194 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
20. 602 F. Supp. 1332 (D. Colo. 1985).
21. See Reckmeyer, No. Cr. 85-00010-A, slip op. at 7-14 (modifying final order of
forfeiture to exclude fees); lanniello, No. S 85 Cr. 115, slip op. at 8-15 (granting motion to
exclude fees from forfeiture and to modify a restraining order preventing payment of
fees); Badalamenti, 614 F. Supp. at 196-97 (rejecting fee forfeiture as justification for
subpoena to lawyer); Rogers, 602 F. Supp. at 1346-50 (granting motion to modify re-
straining order).
22. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1963(c) (West Supp. 1986); 21 U.S.C.A. § 853(c) (West Supp.
1986).
23. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1963(c) (West Supp. 1986); 21 U.S.C.A. § 853(c) (West Supp.
1986).
24. United States v. Rogers, 602 F. Supp. 1332, 1346 (D. Colo. 1985).
25. Id.
26. See id. at 1346 (quoting 18 U.S.C.A. § 1963(c) (Vest Supp. 1986); 21 U.S.C.A.
§ 853(c) (West Supp. 1986)).
27. See Rogers, 602 F. Supp at 1347. "More specifically, the statute says nothing




not make clear what that different treatment is. 2 9 Hence, an attorney
cannot tell from the text of the statutes whether the property transferred
to him is subject to forfeiture. 30 The court, resorting to legislative his-
tory, determined that the statutes apply only to sham transfers-exces-
sive transfers intended not as payment for legal services but as a means of
sheltering assets from forfeiture.3
The restrictive Rogers holding would nullify the plain language of the
relation-back provisions. If the statutes are ambiguous concerning the
rights of attorney-transferees, they are equally ambiguous concerning the
rights of any other transferee, and the sham limitation ought to apply to
all transferees. This would render the objective notice provision in the
statutes32 surplusage by providing an exclusion for any good faith trans-
feree. At any rate, the statutes do contain a plain definition of trans-
ferred property subject to forfeiture. Of property the defendant acquires
in violation of the statutes, "[alny such property that is subsequently
transferred to a person other than the defendant" may be forfeited.3
3
Therefore, it should be clear to an attorney that tainted funds that the
indictment identifies as being sought from the defendant can also be
sought from the attorney.34
The requirement that the transferee be "reasonably without cause to
believe" that the assets were wrongfully obtained on its face denies pro-
tection to a broad group of transferees who were party to no sham, but
who, by dealing with suspicious persons, had reason to believe that prop-
erty received was subject to forfeiture. 35 In United States v. Badala-
menti,3 6 the court, though it exempted legal fees from forfeiture,
admitted that it had to overcome language in the statutes which strongly
suggests that an attorney is subject to an objective notice standard:
The statute is apparently intended to dissuade the commercial world
from dealing with racketeers and traffickers, warning that one who ac-
29. See id.
30. Id.
31. See id. at 1347-48. The court in United States v. Ianniello, No. S 85 Cr. 115, slip
op. at 8-9 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 3, 1985), agreed with the Rogers interpretation.
32. Transferred property is subject to forfeiture unless the transferee was "reasonably
without cause to believe the property was subject to forfeiture." 18 U.S.C.A. § 1963(c)
(West Supp. 1986); 21 U.S.C.A. § 853(c) (West Supp. 1986).
33. Id. (emphasis added).
34. "The indictment or information itself gives notice of the government's intent to
seek forfeiture of the property." 1984 Senate Report, supra note 5, at 203, reprinted in
1984 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 3386 (quoted in Rogers, 602 F. Supp. at 1343); see
also United States v. Raimondo, 721 F.2d 476, 478 (4th Cir. 1983) (indictment notifies
attorney that assets conveyed to him by defendant may represent profits of criminal en-
terprise), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 133 (1984). The description of property in the indict-
ment need be no more specific than the generic language of 18 U.S.C.A. § 1963(a) (West
Supp. 1986) and 21 U.S.C.A. § 853(a) (West Supp. 1986). See Raimondo, 721 F.2d at
477.
35. See Payden v. United States, 605 F. Supp. 839, 849 n.14 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd on
other grounds, 767 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1985).
36. 614 F. Supp. 194 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
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cepts dirty money in payment for goods or services may forfeit it. To
the jeweler, for example, the statute says "Don't sell diamonds to a
racketeer. You may lose the proceeds."
No one is more on notice of likelihood that the money may come
from such prohibited activity than the lawyer who is asked to represent
the defendant in the trial of the indictment.
37
The court in Payden v. United States likewise noted that a lawyer can-
not help but know that his fee may come from an illicit source, but unlike
the Badalamenti court, held that attorneys' fees are subject to
forfeiture.38
The legislative history of the relation-back provisions is scant 9 and
there is even less indication of Congress' particular intent concerning at-
torneys' fees." The court in Rogers relied on the Senate report41 on the
1984 Comprehensive Crime Control Acte2 in support of its conclusion
that the statutes reach only sham transactions.43 The report stated that
the purpose of the relation-back provisions was to "close a potential
loophole in current law whereby the criminal forfeiture sanction could be
avoided by transfers that were not 'arms' length' transactions."'  It also
noted that the bona fide purchaser provisions "should be construed to
deny relief to third parties acting as nominees of the defendant or who
have knowingly engaged in sham or fraudulent transactions. ' 45 The
short passages in the Senate report certainly indicate that one of Con-
gress' concerns was sham transfers; it is a long leap, however, to con-
clude that prohibiting sham transfers was the exclusive purpose of the
statutes."
As evidence of Congress' sensitivity to sixth amendment rights in for-
37. Id. at 196.
38. "One who receives funds with the knowledge that the funds are subject to forfei-
ture cannot be said to have entered into an arms length transaction regardless of the price
paid for the good or service." 605 F. Supp. at 849 n. 14.
39. See United States v. Ianniello, No. S 85 Cr. 115, slip op. at 8 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 3,
1985); United States v. Badalamenti, 614 F. Supp. 194, 196 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
40. See United States v. Ianniello, No. S 85 Cr. 115, slip op. at 8 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 3,
1985).
41. 1984 Senate Report, supra note 5, reprinted in 1984 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News
at 3182 (cited in United States v. Rogers, 602 F. Supp. 1332, 1347 (D. Colo. 1985);
United States v. Ianniello, No. S 85 Cr. 115, slip op. at 8 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 3, 1985)).
42. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837 (1984).
43. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
44. 1984 Senate Report, supra note 5, at 200-01, reprinted in 1984 U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News at 3383-84.
45. Id. at 209 n.47, reprinted in 1984 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 3392 n.47.
46. There is no inconsistency in prohibiting sham transfers and also imposing an ob-
jective notice standard on transferees. Indeed, the legislative history also contains refer-
ence to an objective standard. See id. at 209, reprinted in 1984 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News at 3392 (transferee's claims to property will prevail only when the transferee "had
no reason to believe that the property was subject to forfeiture") (quoted in Payden v.




feiture cases, Rogers quoted47 a footnote in the House report48 on a re-
lated bill, the Comprehensive Drug Penalty Act of 1984.19 In discussing
section 415(j), authorizing courts to enter restraining orders to protect
the availability of property that might be subject to forfeiture, the House
Judiciary Committee wrote: "Nothing in this section is intended to in-
terfere with a person's Sixth Amendment right to counsel."5 0 The Rog-
ers decision ignored the very next sentence in the report: "The
Committee, therefore, does not resolve the conflict in District Court
opinions on the use of restraining orders that impinge on a person's right
to retain counsel in a criminal case."'" Payden inferred from the House
report that Congress did not try to resolve the sixth amendment conflict,
but rather left the issue to the courts. 2
Examination of the broad legislative policy underlying the forfeiture
statutes is more helpful in resolving the attorney fee question than is a
microscopic analysis of the legislative history of the 1984 relation-back
amendments. 3 The fundamental purpose of the forfeiture statutes is to
strip organized crime of its economic power.54 Denying RICO and CCE
defendants the ability to use tainted assets to obtain the best defense
available conforms to this policy.55 By paying an attorney, RICO or
CCE defendants diminish their economic power by spending money on
something they would rather not; yet the purpose of the statutes is not
being accomplished because the defendants receive valuable legal services
in return. To suggest that payment of attorneys' fees realizes the goals of
the forfeiture statutes, by reducing the criminal organization's net in-
come, is to treat defense costs as a business expense deductible from for-
feiture liability.
United States v. Badalamenti found the legislative history of the stat-
utes unclear 56 and acknowledged that "a literal reading of the two forfei-
ture statutes would seem to encompass the legal fee."15 7 Nonetheless, the
Badalamenti court exempted the fee from forfeiture, explaining that fee
forfeiture would raise such constitutional and ethical problems, that the
47. See 602 F. Supp. at 1347-48.
48. See H.R. Rep. No. 845, pt. 1, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 19 n.1 (1984).
49. H.R. 4901, 98th. Cong., 2d Sess. (1984).
50. H.R. Rep. No. 845, pt. 1, 98th Cong. 2d Sess. 19 n.1 (1984).
51. Id. The committee referred to United States v. Mandel, 408 F. Supp. 679 (D. Md.
1976) and United States v. Bello, 470 F. Supp. 723 (S.D. Cal. 1979).
52. See 605 F. Supp. at 850 n.14.
53. Congress intended the RICO statute to be construed broadly. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v.
Imrex Co., 105 S. Ct. 3275, 3286 (1985); United States v. Ginsburg, 773 F.2d 798, 802
(7th Cir. 1985).
54. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
55. Just as the defendant cannot be permitted to obtain "a Rolls-Royce with the fruits
of a crime, he cannot be permitted to obtain the services of the Rolls-Royce of attorneys"
from tainted funds. Payden, 605 F. Supp. at 850 n. 14.
56. See 614 F. Supp. 194, 197 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) ("Nothing of great value to the resolu-
tion has been cited from legislative history.")
57. Id. at 196; accord United States v. Reckmeyer, No. Cr. 85-00010-A, slip op. at 8
(E.D. Va. Mar. 27, 1986).
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court could not conceive that Congress intended forfeiture of attorneys'
fees.58
The Badalamenti court, by forthrightly stating the basis of its interpre-
tation of the statutes, avoided the strained Rogers reading of the text and
legislative history.59 Though its ultimate result was an unnecessarily nar-
row construction of the statutes, the Badalamenti court was correct in
looking to the sixth amendment for guidance in construing the statutes.
The plain language of the statutes and the lack of evidence of a clear
legislative intent to exclude attorneys' fees from forfeiture demand the
conclusion that the statutes were intended to apply to the fees. The Con-
stitution therefore controls the extent to which legal fees are forfeitable.
II. CoNsTrruTioNAL PROBLEMS
The sixth amendment, as interpreted in the landmark decision Powell
v. Alabama," requires for a conviction to be valid that a criminal defend-
ant be afforded the opportunity to be represented by effective counsel. 6'
It has been argued that forfeiture of attorneys' fees interferes with that
right in several ways: by making it impossible for a defendant to retain
counsel of his choosing;62 by undermining the effectiveness of counsel by
placing him in a position of conflict;63 and by chilling attorney-client
communication."
A. Choice of Counsel
The most serious constitutional conflict created by the forfeiture of
attorneys' fees is that the threat of forfeiture hinders a defendant's efforts
to hire a lawyer. Private counsel may refuse to take a case if there is a
possibility that his fee will be seized.65 Counsel's dilemma is especially
acute in RICO and CCE cases where the fee and time investment are
often large and the odds of acquittal poor.66
An outgrowth of the right to effective counsel is that in most cases, if a
58. See 614 F. Supp. at 196; Reckmeyer, No. Cr. 85-00010-A, slip op. at 8 (E.D. Va.
Mar. 27, 1986).
59. See supra notes 33-38.
60. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
61. See id at 53; see also Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 469 (1981).
62. See infra Part II.A.
63. See infra Part II.B.
64. See infra Part II.C.
65. United States v. Ianniello, No. S 85 Cr. 115, slip op. at 11 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 3,
1985); United States v. Badalamenti, 614 F. Supp. 194, 196 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
66. See Association of the Bar of the City of New York Committee on Criminal Ad-
vocacy, The Issuance of Subpoenas Upon Lawyers in Criminal Cases by State and Fed-
eral Prosecutors: A Call for Immediate Remedial Action app. 9 n.78 (1985) (law firm
cannot survive if fees for big criminal cases are contingent on success, where there is a
90% conviction rate) [hereinafter cited as Bar Association Report]. A Justice Depart-
ment study shows that of 9164 federal prosecutions for drug offenses in 1983, defendants
were convicted in 7490, or 82%, of those cases. See Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S.
Dep't of Justice, Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics 564 (1984).
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defendant can afford to retain counsel, he has the right to counsel of his
choosing.6 7 The right to choice of counsel is not, however, absolute.68 It
must sometimes give way to competing interests such as the avoidance of
ethical confficts,69 the need for evidence70 and the efficient and orderly
administration of justice. 71 The public interest in preserving the court's
jurisdiction over forfeitable assets seems at least as weighty an interest as
any of these.72
The RICO defendant's main problem is not merely inability to retain a
particular lawyer, but inability to retain any lawyer. 73 Appointed coun-
sel would then be available,74 but some courts and commentators have
doubted the effectiveness of appointed counsel in RICO and CCE
cases.75 The court in United States v. Rogers noted that the costs of a
RICO defense are high and that the resources and expertise of the aver-
age federal public defender's office might be insufficient to meet the
67. Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433, 439 (1958), overruled on other grounds, Mi-
randa v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 (1932);
United States v. Agosto, 675 F.2d 965, 969 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 834 (1982);
United States v. Burton, 584 F.2d 485, 488-89 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
1069 (1979).
68. Linton v. Perini, 656 F.2d 207, 209 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1162
(1982); United States v. Burton, 584 F.2d 485, 489 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 1069 (1979); Gandy v. Alabama, 569 F.2d 1318, 1323 (5th Cir. 1978).
69. See United States v. James, 708 F.2d 40, 43-44, 46 (2d Cir. 1983) (defendant's
chosen counsel disqualified because he had represented prosecution witness).
70. See Roe v. United States, 781 F.2d 238, 250-51 (2d Cir. 1986) (en banc) (attorney
may have to disclose fee information even though this might force his disqualification),
cert. denied, 54 U.S.L.W. 3660 (U.S. Apr. 8, 1986).
71. United States v. Burton, 584 F.2d 485, 489-90 (D.C. Cir 1978) (one of two re-
tained counsel withdraws; continuance denied), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1069 (1979);
United States v. Tortora, 464 F.2d 1202, 1206, 1210 (2d Cir.) (continuance to accommo-
date defendant's chosen counsel's other trial and army reserve obligations during period
scheduled for trial denied), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1063 (1972); United States v. Hampton,
457 F.2d 299, 301 (7th Cir.) (on eve of trial, indigent defendant's mother gives defendant
money; continuance to substitute retained counsel for appointed counsel denied), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 856 (1972).
72. The importance of preserving the court's control over suspect assets was recog-
nized in 1984 Senate Report, supra note 5, at 195, reprinted in 1984 U.S. Code Cong &
Ad. News at 3378, and in United States v. Long, 654 F.2d 911, 915 (3d Cir. 1981).
73. United States v. Badalamenti, 614 F. Supp. 194, 197-98 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
74. See Payden v. United States, 605 F. Supp. 839, 853 & n. 19 (S.D.N.Y), rev'd on
other grounds, 767 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1985); United States v. Bello, 470 F. Supp. 723, 725
(S.D. Cal. 1979). The court in United States v. Badalamenti, 614 F. Supp. 194 (S.D.N.Y.
1985), worried that since the defendant was not actually indigent, he could not avail
himself of appointed counsel. See id. at 197; United States v. Janniello, No. S 85 Cr. 115,
slip op. at 11-12 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 3, 1985). It is puzzling that the Badalamenti court saw
broad implied protections of the right to counsel in the forfeiture statutes but took such a
niggardly view of the right to appointed counsel under the Criminal Justice Act, 18
U.S.C. § 3006A (1982). The Badalamenti court might be reluctant to follow its own
stern dictum in actually deciding whether the Criminal Justice Act applies to defendants
rendered constructively indigent by government action.
75. See United States v. Rogers, 602 F. Supp. 1332, 1349-50 (D. Colo. 1985); Bar




The court in Payden v. United States rejected the idea that appointed
counsel is inherently unfit to handle complex criminal cases.' Further,
that forfeiture cases are usually "big cases requiring months to prepare
and try"7" would not in itself seem to be a problem unless already over-
taxed public defenders were swamped by an influx of giant RICO cases. 9
And, while the defendant's preference for the lawyer who represented
him during the grand jury investigation is understandable, 0 this does not
mean that any other trial representation is constitutionally inadequate.,
Fee forfeiture poses a challenge of another sort to the system of court-
appointed criminal representation. Specialists accustomed to more lucra-
tive fees will not be attracted by the rates paid appointed counsel under
the Criminal Justice Act (CJA). 2 But getting the right kind of specialist
to work as appointed counsel is part of a larger problem-getting a law-
yer at all. 3 Because of the time and effort involved,"' being appointed
76. The Rogers court wrote:
The retort to the claim of denial of counsel of one's choice, that appointed coun-
sel is available, pays no more than lip service to due process and the right to
counsel. . . The costs of mounting a defense of an indictment under RICO
are far beyond the resources or expertise of the average federal public defender's
office which is already overtaxed. Ignoring the complexity of the legal issues
involved, the defense of RICO accusations requires the marshalling of facts and
information of vast quantities perhaps constituting the whole of several world-
wide business enterprises. . . . Adequate defense of RICO cases generally re-
quires representation during grand jury investigations lasting as long as two or
three years. Counsel appointed ninety or one hundred and twenty days before
trial is patently inadequate.
602 F. Supp. at 1349-50.
77. 605 F. Supp. 839, 853 n.19 (S.D.N.Y.) (citing United States v. Bello, 470 F. Supp.
723, 725 (S.D. Cal. 1979)), rev'd on other grounds, 767 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1985).
78. United States v. Badalamenti, 614 F. Supp. 194, 196 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
79. A substantial increase in workload undeniably would affect the overall quality of
public representation. The proposal in this Note is designed to avoid overburdening
Legal Aid as a result of fee forfeiture. See infra note 186.
80. See Bar Association Report, supra note 66, at 24; cf. United States v. Cunning-
ham, 672 F.2d 1064, 1068-71 (2d Cir. 1982) (defendant's interest in particular "repeat-
edly victorious" counsel with whom he had long relationship outweighed possible conflict
of interest resulting from same attorney's previous representation of prosecution witness),
cert. denied, 466 U.S. 951 (1984).
81. See United States v. James, 708 F.2d 40, 44-45 (2d Cir. 1983) (same situation as
United States v. Cunningham, 672 F.2d 1064 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denited, 466 U.S. 951
(1984), see supra note 80, but interests of government, witness and the public in this case
outweigh defendant's interest in particular trusted counsel); United States v. Bello, 470 F.
Supp. 723, 725 (S.D. Cal. 1979) (court distinguishes right to counsel of choice from right
to counsel in general). Moreover, appointment of counsel after indictment does not give
the government an unfair head start. Contrary to the suggestions of the Rogers court, see
supra note 76 and accompanying text, the sixth amendment does not guarantee counsel
during grand jury proceedings. See Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 687-89 (1972) (plural-
ity opinion); Roe v. United States, 781 F.2d 238, 244 (2d Cir. 1986) (en banc), cert.
denied, 54 U.S.L.W. 3660 (U.S. Apr. 8, 1986).
82. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3006A (West 1985). CJA permits a maximum rate of S60 per hour
for time in court and $40 per hour for time outside. See id. § 3006A(d).
83. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
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counsel in a RICO or CCE case at CJA rates is a pro bono commitment
few lawyers, even altruistic ones, would be willing to accept.
Another concern related to the choice of counsel issue is that fee forfei-
ture may lead to abuse of the adversary system s5 Subjecting attorneys'
fees to forfeiture creates the opportunity for the government to use forfei-
ture as a means to knock out the most skillful advocate for the defense
and thus "eliminate the adversary from the adversary process."86 In ad-
dition to giving the government the "ultimate tactical advantage of being
able to exclude competent defense counsel as it chooses,"18 7 the statutes
could also be used to target unpopular attorneys.88
The Department of Justice, in response to the furor raised by the de-
fense bar, has adopted standards for seeking fee forfeiture.8 9 Federal
prosecutors will seek fee forfeiture only when they have reason to believe
that a defense lawyer had actual knowledge that payment came from the
proceeds of crime."° This policy should reduce the number of cases in
which forfeiture is sought and preclude prosecutors from arbitrarily ap-
pending a forfeiture count to an indictment to scare off potential counsel.
The court in United States v. Rogers, however, took the view that the
mere possibility of abuse is intolerable.9" While the court presumed that
most prosecutors act in good faith, it could not ignore "the potential for
prosecutorial manipulation."92 Even so, this problem should not lead us
to a hasty conclusion. Less drastic remedies for this kind of
prosecutorial misconduct are available.93
B. Conflicts of Interest
Even if a defendant can get a lawyer to take his case, the retained
lawyer's effectiveness as a vigorous advocate may be diminished because
fee forfeiture places the attorney in a position of conflict.94 One attribute
of the effective counsel guaranteed by Powell is freedom from conflicts of
84. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
85. See United States v. Rogers, 602 F. Supp. 1332, 1350 (D. Colo. 1985).
86. Id. at 1350. The court in Payden did not share the Rogers court's fears, in light of
a strong caution to the government against attorney shopping. See 605 F. Supp. at 853.
87. United States v. Rogers, 602 F. Supp. 1332, 1350 (D. Colo. 1985).
88. Bar Association Report, supra note 66, at 30-31.
89. See Justice Department Guidelines on Forfeiture of Attorneys' Fees, 38 Crim. L.
Rep. (BNA) 3001 (Oct. 2, 1985).
90. Id. at 3004. "Actual knowledge," as used in the Justice Department guidelines, is
not a completely subjective test. An attorney has actual knowledge that an asset is sub-
ject to forfeiture if he knows that the government has asserted that the particular asset is
subject to forfeiture. Id. at 3004. However, the description of the claimed property must
be specific. An all-inclusive forfeiture allegation does not in itself satisfy the "actual
knowledge" requirement of the guidelines. See id. at 3005.
91. See United States v. Rogers, 602 F. Supp. 1332, 1350 (D. Colo. 1985).
92. Id.
93. See infra note 134.
94. See United States v. Janniello, No. S 85 Cr. 115, slip op. at 13-14 (S.D.N.Y. Sept.
3, 1985); United States v. Badalamenti, 614 F. Supp. 194, 196 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
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interest.9" In the fee-forfeiture case the attorney's representation of his
client might be influenced by the attorney's desire to preserve his fee. 96 It
has been suggested that a lawyer may be motivated to negotiate a plea
bargain more attractive to the lawyer than the client.9 The lawyer
might bargain for a guilty plea not involving forfeiture of the fee98 or,
unable to strike such a deal, advise going to trial when a guilty plea
would better serve his client.99
The situation created by the possibility of fee forfeiture has been lik-
ened to a contingent fee arrangement," eo which is banned in a criminal
case by the Model Code of Professional Responsibility. 10 It is uncertain,
however, if the public policies behind the rule are relevant in the fee-
forfeiture situation. The rule against contingent fees in criminal cases
has been stated in dicta"0 2 and by commentators, 0 3 but the holdings are
so few and so old that "it is doubtful that there can be said to be any
current law on the subject."'I The most frequently stated rationales are
that a contingent fee in a criminal case creates potential for corruption of
justice 5 and that legal services in a criminal case do not produce a res or
fund out of which the fee can be paid.' 6
The corruption question has come up in connection with contingent
95. See Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 271-72 (1981) (party with interest possibly
adverse to defendant retains lawyer for defendant); Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 345
(1980) (multiple defendants represented by same lawyer); Holloway v. Arkansas, 435
U.S. 475, 481-82 (1978) (same); Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 76 (1942) (same).
96. See United States v. Ianniello, No. S 85 Cr. 115, slip op. at 13-14 (S.D.N.Y. Sept.
3, 1985); United States v. Badalamenti, 614 F. Supp. 194, 196-97 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
97. See United States v. Ianniello, No. S 85 Cr. 115, slip op. at 13-14 (S.D.N.Y. Sept.
3, 1985); United States v. Badalamenti, 614 F. Supp. 194, 196-97 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
98. See United States v. lanniello, No. S 85 Cr. 115, slip op. at 13-14 (S.D.N.Y. Sept.
3, 1985); United States v. Badalamenti, 614 F. Supp. 194, 196-97 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
99. United States v. Ianniello, No. S 85 Cr. 115, slip op. at 13-14 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 3,
1985). Payden v. United States, 605 F. Supp. 839 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd on other grounds, 767
F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1985), suggested as a solution to the conflict problem that the trial be
bifurcated, with separate proceedings for guilt and forfeiture. See id. at 850 n.14. A
disinterested attorney would represent the defendant in the forfeiture portion of the trial.
Id. This proposal is not directed at the evil to be avoided. Tainting of the trial is not the
problem. Corruption of the plea bargaining process is. Though it is conceivable that the
attorney whose fee is subject to forfeiture may deliberately or unconsciously direct more
of his efforts toward avoiding forfeiture than obtaining acquittal, the effect this could
have on a jury's determination is remote.
100. See United States v. lanniello, No. S 85 Cr. 115, slip op. at 13 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 3,
1985); United States v. Badalamenti, 614 F. Supp. 194, 196 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
101. Model Code of Professional Responsibility DR 2-106(C) (1983).
102. See Couture v. Mammoth Groceries, Inc., 117 N.H. 294, 296, 371 A.2d 1184,
1186 (1977).
103. See 6A A. Corbin, Contracts § 1424, at 366-67 (1962).
104. F. MacKinnon, Contingent Fees for Legal Services 52 (1964). The problem
rarely arises because criminal defense attorneys usually demand their fees before trial,
when the defendant has some interest in paying. Id.
105. See Peyton v. Margiotti, 398 Pa. 86, 90, 156 A.2d 865, 867 (1959); Model Code of
Professional Responsibility DR 2-106(C) n.90 (1983).
106. Model Code of Professional Responsibility EC 2-20 (1983).
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fees for the use of personal influence to procure pardons.10 7 However,
personal influence is to no significant extent one of the services a lawyer
renders in a criminal case.' 0 8 It is also not clear that the res argument is
particularly apt if the lawyer is helping to preserve a res from
forfeiture.,0 9
The argument that fee forfeiture violates the contingent fee ban lacks
independent force. Whatever the traditional policies against contingent
fees in a criminal case, the practical distinction between a "contingent"
forfeitable fee and a permissible contingent fee in a civil case is that in the
fee-forfeiture case there is the potential, albeit slight, for divergence of
interest of the client and attorney. 110 This simply restates the conflict
argument.
Payden v. United States, in dismissing the conflict problem, empha-
sized the rule that a lawyer must continue to represent his client vigor-
ously even if the client might not be able to pay."'I The Model Code of
Professional Responsibility permits a lawyer to withdraw from a case
only in certain situations' 1 2 enumerated in certain disciplinary rules.' 13
The particularly relevant provision permits withdrawal if the client
"[dieliberately disregards an agreement or obligation to the lawyer as to
expenses or fees.""' 4 The client's unintentional inability to pay his fees
does not fall within any category of permissive withdrawal.
The problem with the Payden view is that it assumes a defendant has
already obtained a lawyer and it ignores the strand running through the
rules that a lawyer should not put himself in a position where his ethics
will be put to the test.' ' Though the rules mandate that once a lawyer
has committed himself to a client he must continue, they also tell the
107. See Peyton v. Margiotti, 398 Pa. 86, 90-91, 156 A.2d 865, 867 (1959).
108. Remission of forfeiture by the executive branch is akin to a pardon. See 17 C.J.S.
Contracts § 214(b) (1963). While a good working relationship with the prosecutor's office
is helpful, the attorneys' fees discussed in this Note can hardly be said to be for influence
peddling.
109. A contingent fee contract for the defense of an unliquidated tort damage claim,
where the fee was to be a fraction of the difference between the plaintiff's claim and the
amount actually awarded, was held void because the factors on which the fee depended
bore "no logical relationship to the value of the services." Wunschel Law Firm v. Cla-
baugh, 291 N.W.2d 331, 337 (Iowa 1980). Plaintiffs in tort actions may make unreasona-
bly large claims. See id. at 336. Grand juries should be relied on to show more restraint
in rendering an indictment with a forfeiture count than a civil plaintiff in fashioning an ad
damnum clause in a complaint.
110. See supra notes 94-99 and accompanying text.
111. See Payden v. United States, 605 F. Supp. 839, 848-49 (S.D.N.Y.) (citing United
States v. Ramey, 559 F. Supp. 60, 62 (E.D. Tenn. 1981)), rev'don other grounds, 767 F.2d
26 (2d Cir. 1985).
112. See Model Code of Professional Responsibility DR 7-101(A)(2) (1983).
113. See id. DR 2-110(C) (various reasons for permissive withdrawal); id. DR 5-102
(lawyer as witness); id. DR 5-105 (lawyer with personal stake in litigation).
114. Id. DR 2-1 10(C)(1)(f) (emphasis added).
115. See, e.g., id. DR 5-101 (lawyer should refuse employment when his own interest
may impair his independent professional judgment); id. DR 5-103 (lawyer should avoid
acquiring an interest in litigation he is conducting for a client).
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lawyer to avoid involving himself in cases of potential conflict in the first
place.' 16
The conflict problem is, however, more an academic legal matter than
a practical problem. First, the argument that a RICO or CCE defendant
may be deceived into accepting a plea bargain that sends him to prison
but assures his lawyer a fee is a poor compliment to the intelligence of
defendants. Second, we should have some faith in the pride and integrity
of the bar or at least the ability of the bar to police itself. To arrange a
plea that benefits the lawyer and unnecessarily sends the client to prison
is a bad way to attract business and a good way to be disbarred. 17
Third, if the RICO or CCE defendant obtains a lawyer, the lawyer is not
likely to be motivated by the opportunity to make a quick fee by negoti-
ating a plea not involving forfeiture." 8 The threat posed by the unscru-
pulous stranger is fanciful, and the danger that a well-intentioned and
trusted attorney may succumb to temptation is outweighed by the de-
fendant's qualified right to counsel of his own choice, on terms to which
he intelligently assents." 9
C. Chill on Attorney-Client Communication
Another way in which the statutes may diminish the effectiveness of
retained counsel is by interfering with attorney-client communication. 20
The forfeiture statutes put the onus on the third party transferee to prove
his bona fide purchaser status at a post-trial hearing.' 2' It has been con-
116. See id. DR 5-101; id. DR 5-103.
117. Abandoning the client's cause while professing otherwise to the client is a ground
for disbarment. See, e.g., Fitzpatrick v. State Bar, 20 Cal.3d 73, 84-86, 88, 569 P.2d 763,
768-69, 771, 141 Cal. Rptr. 169, 174-75, 177 (1977); In re Miller, 54 A.D.2d 69, 70, 387
N.Y.S.2d 445, 445-446 (1976). Abandonment is an understated way of describing be-
trayal of a client for a fee.
118. The risk of receiving no fee would dissuade all but the most venturesome, unscru-
pulous or desperate lawyers from taking the case. See supra notes 65-66 and accompany-
ing text.
119. Cf. Maxwell v. Superior Ct., 30 Cal. 3d 606, 612-22, 639 P.2d 248, 251-58, 180
Cal. Rptr. 177, 180-87 (1982) (counsel represented indigent defendant in exchange for
publication rights to defendant's story; court, while criticizing the fee arrangement, held
that disqualification of counsel of choice was not required where the defendant, aware of
and competent to evaluate the potential conflicts, willingly entered the fee arrangement).
In attempting to reverse a conviction because of ineffiective assistance of counsel, a de-
fendant has a heavier burden in the case of a lawyer's financial conflict resulting from a
fee arrangement into which the defendant entered willingly than in a multiple representa-
tion case, where the defendant cannot be assumed to know as well as his lawyer how his
defense will conflict with another defendant's. See United States v. Marrera, 768 F.2d
201, 207 (7th Cir. 1985) (share of movie rights). Some may question if a defendant's
decision can be called willing when his options are appointed counsel or conflict-ridden
retained counsel. But to say that the defendant is given Hobson's choice is to make the
erroneous assumption that appointed counsel is constitutionally inadequate. See supra
.notes 77-81 and accompanying text.
120. See United States v. Badalamenti, 614 F. Supp. 194, 196 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); United
States v. Rogers, 602 F. Supp. 1332, 1348-49 (D. Colo. 1985).




tended that if the attorney may later have to testify about his knowledge
of the source of fees, he may be reluctant to inquire fully into his client's
activities.122 The resulting impediment to full, frank attorney-client com-
munication is in a sense a facet of the conflict of interest problem. Here,
the duty to become well informed conflicts with the interest in remaining
a bona fide purchaser.
Attorney-client communication would be hampered only if the attor-
ney had to testify at a forfeiture hearing about his knowledge of the de-
fendant's assets.12 3 This problem arises only under a restrictive
interpretation of the statutes, such as one allowing fee forfeiture only
when the attorney is party to a sham124 or accepts the fee with actual
knowledge that the fee was illegally obtained. So construed, the statutes
would require inquiry into the lawyer's state of mind and the circum-
stances surrounding payment of the fee. 125
Under an objective standard of good faith it is not necessary to deter-
mine the lawyer's intent or knowledge.'26 It suffices for forfeiture liabil-
ity that the attorney have reason to believe that the fee was forfeitable. 127
An indictment with a forfeiture count is notice of the government's claim
to the attorney's fee.128
III. USE OF A PRETRIAL HEARING TO ALLEVIATE THE
CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS
The serious constitutional objection to fee forfeiture is that it restricts a
defendant's access to retained counsel. This infirmity deserves more con-
sideration than the Payden v. United States'29 court gave it.' 30 Contrary
to the suggestions in the four cases that exempted fees from forfeiture, 1 31
however, the constitutional difficulties do not preclude enforcement of
122. See United States v. Badalamenti, 614 F. Supp. 194, 196 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Unitcd
States v. Rogers, 602 F. Supp. 1332, 1348-49 (D. Colo. 1985).
123. DePetris & Bachrach, supra note 13, at 4, col. 4. An equally significant intrusion
into the attorney-client relationship is possible when the fee is used as evidence of the
client's guilt, as when defendant, with no legitimate source of income, pays large legal
fees. The Second Circuit has stated that an attorney may be compelled to turn over fee
information though doing so might require his testimony at trial and result in his disqual-
ification. See Roe v. United States, 781 F.2d 238, 250-51 (2d Cir. 1986) (en banc), cert.
denied, 54 U.S.L.W. 3660 (U.S. Apr. 8, 1986).
124. See United States v. lanniello, No. S 85 Cr. 115, slip op. at 15 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 3,
1985); United States v. Rogers, 602 F. Supp. 1332, 1347-48 (D. Colo. 1985).
125. See DePetris & Bachrach, supra note 13, at 4, col. 4.
126. See supra notes 32-38 and accompanying text.
127. See supra notes 32-38 and accompanying text.
128. See supra note 34.
129. 605 F. Supp. 839, 849 n. 14 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd on other grounds, 767 F.2d 26, 29
(2d Cir. 1985).
130. See id.
131. See United States v. Reckmeyer, No. Cr. 85-00010-A, slip op. at 8-9 (E.D. Va.
Mar. 27, 1986); United States v. lanniello, No. S 85 Cr. 115, slip op. at 14-15 (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 3, 1985); United States v. Badalamenti, 614 F. Supp. 194, 198 (S.D.N.Y. 1985);
United States v. Rogers, 602 F. Supp. 1332, 1349-50 (D. Colo. 1985).
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the statutes against otherwise legitimate legal fees. Unfortunately, the
courts addressing the fee-forfeiture question declined to consider less
drastic remedies that would protect the defendant's rights while still ef-
fectuating the purpose of the forfeiture statutes.
To reach a constitutional result, the courts need only have found in the
statutes an implied requirement for a pretrial hearing regarding fee for-
feiture. 132 In so doing, they would have followed a procedure established
in cases of RICO and CCE preliminary injunctions.' 33 A hearing, focus-
ing on the strength of the government's claim to the assets sought, would
balance, on the one hand, the defendant's constitutional right to counsel,
and on the other, the strong government interest in preserving the court's
ability to impose the forfeiture sanction, and would prevent the govern-
ment from using fee forfeiture abusively.1 34
Since the pretrial deprivation of rights in the case of fee forfeiture is
caused by the prospect of the post-conviction penalty, if the defendant
prevails at the pretrial hearing the court would immediately exempt the
fees from forfeiture, even if the defendant should subsequently be con-
victed and a verdict of forfeiture rendered. Creating a permanent exemp-
tion is the only way to make the hearing a meaningful protection of a
defendant's rights. If the defendant loses the hearing, he would be repre-
sented by appointed counsel or by his chosen attorney. The chosen attor-
ney would be paid at appointed counsel rates but be eligible for his entire
agreed fee if the defendant prevails at trial. 35
The fee-forfeiture hearing is a major modification of the statutes. Un-
like a preliminary injunction order, which maintains the status quo so
that the defendant may forfeit his assets upon a judgment of forfeiture,
the order resulting from a fee-forfeiture hearing precludes the court from
imposing the ultimate forfeiture sanction. Congress has allowed courts
little discretion to reduce the forfeiture penalty. 136 However, Congress
132. Such an approach is advocated in DePetris & Bachrach, supra note 13, at 4. col.
1-2. As a precondition for holding such a hearing, the defendant should have to swear
that he has no assets from which to pay a fee besides those the government is seeking. Id.
at 4, col. 3.
133. See infra notes 141-52 and accompanying text.
134. For a discussion of the problem of government "attorney shopping," see supra
notes 85-91 and accompanying text. A hearing requirement would prevent the govern-
ment from using a mere indictment with a forfeiture count to harass a particular defend-
ant or lawyer. It is improbable that the government would endanger its witnesses and
disclose its trial strategy at a pretrial hearing just to spite a defendant. See infra notes
154-55 and accompanying text. Further, it may be within the district court's supervisory
powers to exempt fees from forfeiture that is sought maliciously. Cf In re Grand Jury
Matters, 751 F.2d. 13, 15-16, 19 (1st Cir. 1984) (district court did not abuse discretion in
quashing fee information subpoena obtained to harrass defendant and his lawyer).
135. See infra Part III.D.
136. Though courts have wide discretion in fashioning preliminary procedures, see
United States v. L'Hoste, 609 F.2d 796, 811 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 833 (1980);
United States v. Veon, 538 F. Supp. 237, 242-43 (E.D. Cal. 1982); 18 U.S.C.A. § 1963(e)(West Supp. 1986); 21 U.S.C.A. § 853(e) (West Supp. 1986), forfeiture sanctions are
mandatory and courts have no authority to remit forfeiture. L'Hoste, 609 F.2d at 811-12.
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also specifically intended that the statutes be applied in accordance with
the sixth amendment.137 An implied hearing requirement achieves that
purpose through less radical a modification than an absolute exemption
of attorneys' fees from forfeiture.
138
A. The Long Hearing Requirement for Pretrial Injunctions Under
RICO and CCE
The predicament of the accused RICO or CCE offender who is
shunned by defense counsel because of the possibility of seizure of fees
resembles that of a defendant whose assets are frozen by a pretrial injunc-
tion. The defendant who cannot get a lawyer to take his money has had
his assets as effectively frozen as though he were enjoined from transfer-
ring the money. Prior to the relation-back amendments, there was little
case law concerning the effect of preliminary injunctions on the right to
counsel.1 39 However, due process protections developed in injunction
cases provide a model for resolving the fee-forfeiture problem.
137. This is one point on which the decisions on fee forfeiture are unanimous. See
supra notes 47-52 and accompanying text.
138. Constitutionally requisite procedures for the administration of a statute may be
implied to preserve the validity of the statute. 'See Callen v. Sherman's, Inc., 92 N.J. 114,
134, 455 A.2d 1102, 1112 (1983); People v. Amor, 12 Cal. 3d 20, 30, 523 P.2d 1173, 1179,
114 Cal. Rptr. 765, 771 (1974). An implied hearing requirement reconciles the plain
language of 18 U.S.C.A. § 1963(c) and 21 U.S.C.A. § 853(c) embracing attorneys' fees,
see supra notes 33-36 and accompanying text, with Congress' sixth amendment concerns.
An alternative to a hearing and appointment of counsel under the CJA is exemption of
a reasonable fee from forfeiture. Though not as drastic as an absolute exemption, a rea-
sonable fee scheme would intrude more deeply than the proposal in this Note into areas
where courts should not intrude if possible. Congress, through the CJA, has established
the maximum rates, reasonable or not, that the government may pay for appointed coun-
sel. See supra note 82. A RICO or CCE exception to the CJA rates would better be left
to Congress. Congress has also given courts little latitude to make "reasonable" deduc-
tions from the forfeiture penalty. See supra note 136 and accompanying text. The gov-
ernment, of course, would be free to negotiate a reasonable fee. The negotiated fee would
primarily depend on the strength of the government's case and the government's willing-
ness to disclose its case at a pretrial hearing. The government proposed an exempt fee of
$80 per hour in United States v. Ianniello, No. S 85 Cr. 115, slip op. at 16 (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 3, 1985). There should be enough lawyers willing to work at $80 per hour that the
defendant can find capable representation.
139. The only holding dealing squarely with the issue is United States v. Bello, 470 F.
Supp. 723, 725 (S.D. Cal. 1979), which upheld a preliminary injunction over the objec-
tion that the injunction prevented the defendant from retaining counsel of his choice.
The court relied on United States v. Brodson, 241 F.2d 107, 11.0-I1 (7th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 354 U.S. 911 (1957), in which a preliminary injunction was upheld in a tax evasion
case though it denied the defendant the means to hire an accountant. In United States v.
Long, 654 F.2d 911, 913, 915 (3d Cir. 1981), assets transferred to an attorney were held
to be forfeitable, but the decision did not directly address the sixth amendment issue.
United States v. Ianniello, No. S 85 Cr. 115, slip op. at 14-15 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 3, 1985), in
exempting attorneys' fees from forfeiture, distinguished Long on the ground that Long
was decided on general due process, rather than sixth amendment, grounds. Several
cases have suggested in dicta that a preliminary injunction might be modified to allow the
defendant to retain counsel. See United States v. Lewis, 759 F.2d 1316, 1325-26 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 406 (1985); United States v. Ray, 731 F.2d 1361, 1365-66
(9th Cir. 1984); United States v. Veon, 538 F. Supp. 237, 247 n.16 (E.D. Cal. 1982).
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Prior to the 1984 amendments, the RICO and CCE forfeiture statutes
contained no procedural guidelines for the issuance of preliminary in-
junctions-" The cases interpreted the pre-amendment statutes as con-
taining procedural safeguards implied by the fifth amendment due
process clause.14 ' These pre-amendment decisions recognized that the
government may obtain a brief ex parte restraining order, based solely on
an indictment, to deny the defendant the opportunity to frustrate the
purpose of the forfeiture proceeding by immediately disposing of his
property. 42 However, since due process requires an opportunity to be
heard "at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner,"' 43 most of
these decisions held that a full evidentiary hearing was required before
the restrictions on the defendant's assets could continue beyond the pe-
riod of a temporary restraining order.1"
In imposing a hearing requirement, the pre-amendment cases modeled
their approach on the civil rules governing preliminary injunctions. 45
Adoption of these civil procedures is not surprising, considering the lack
of standards regarding pretrial injunctions in the forfeiture statutes' legis-
lative history'" and the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. 147
The cases also borrowed from the civil rules in determining what must
be proved at the hearing. In United States v. Mandel,4 ' the court stated
that the four traditional factors governing the issuance of preliminary
injunctions in civil cases should also govern preliminary injunctions
under RICO. 14 9 The questions to be investigated are
(1) Has the petitioner made a strong showing that he is likely to prevail
on the merits at trial? (2) Has irreparable harm in the absence of relief
been shown? (3) Would the issuance of the injunction substantially
140. 1984 Senate Report, supra note 5, at 195, reprinted in 1984 U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News at 3378.
141. See United States v. Lewis, 759 F.2d 1316, 1324-25 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S.
Ct. 406 (1985); United States v. Ray, 731 F.2d 1361, 1366 (9th Cir. 1984); United States
v. Spilotro, 680 F.2d 612, 617 (9th Cir. 1982); United States v. Long, 654 F.2d 911, 915
(3d Cir. 1981); United States v. Veon, 538 F. Supp. 237, 244-45 (E.D. Cal. 1982).
142. See United States v. Long, 654 F.2d 911, 915 (3d Cir. 1981); United States v.
Veon, 538 F. Supp. 237, 240, 242-43 (E.D. Cal. 1982).
143. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965); see United States v. S8850, 461
U.S. 555, 562 (1983); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80 (1972).
144. United States v. Lewis, 759 F.2d 1316, 1325 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 406
(1985); United States v. Ray, 731 F.2d 1361, 1366 (9th Cir. 1984); United States v. Long,
654 F.2d 911, 915 (3d Cir. 1981). Contra United States v. Bello, 470 F. Supp. 723, 724-25
(S.D. Cal. 1979); United States v. Scalzitti, 408 F. Supp. 1014, 1014-15 (W.D. Pa. 1975),
appeal dismissed mem., 556 F.2d 569 (3d Cir. 1977).
145. See, e.g., United States v. Lewis, 759 F.2d 1316, 1325 (8th Cir.) (Fed. R. Civ. P.
65 is incorporated by implication in CCE), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 406 (1985); United
States v. Crozier, 674 F.2d 1293, 1297-98 (9th Cir. 1982) (same), vacated and remanded
for rehearing, 104 S. Ct. 3575 (1984).
146. See United States v. Mandel, 408 F. Supp. 679, 681-82 (D. Md. 1976).
147. The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure are silent on preliminary forfeiture pro-
cedures. See United States v. Veon, 538 F. Supp. 237, 246 n.12 (E.D. Cal. 1982).
148. 408 F. Supp. 679 (D. Md. 1976).
149. See id. at 682 (dictum).
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harm other parties interested in the proceedings? and (4) Where does
the public interest lie? 150
In applying this law to RICO and CCE injunctions, the Mandel deci-
sion and the widely followed decision in United States v. Long'51 focused
on the first factor, and determined that the government must prove likeli-
hood of defendant's guilt and likelihood of forfeitability of the assets the
government seeks to freeze.1
5 2
By enacting the 1984 amendments, Congress rejected the implication
of a mandatory hearing on preliminary injunctions. The new forfeiture
statutes permit a preliminary injunction on the strength of an indictment
alone. 153 The legislative history specifically indicates that a pretrial evi-
dentiary hearing on the merits need not be held. The Senate report noted
that a hearing requirement would make it difficult for a prosecutor to
seek a preliminary injunction "because of the potential for damaging pre-
mature disclosure of the government's case. . . and for jeopardizing the
safety of witnesses and victims in racketeering and narcotics trafficking
cases."' 154 For similar reasons, the statutes make hearsay admissible at a
preliminary injunction hearing.' 55
Now that Congress has articulated particular, compelling reasons for
dispensing with the hearing, it will be interesting to see if the courts will
be as eager to overturn the new statute as they were to fill the due process
gap in the old one. The first Court of Appeals decision dealing with the
new preliminary injunction procedures declared them unconstitutional
and continued to find a hearing requirement implied.'5 6
B. Applying the Long Approach to Forfeiture of Attorneys' Fees
Regardless of whether due process requires a hearing to protect prop-
erty interests affected by an injunction, a hearing should be required in
fee-forfeiture cases,' 5 7 where there is, in addition to an effective restraint
150. Id.
151. 654 F.2d 911 (3d Cir. 1981).
152. See id. at 915; Mandel, 408 F. Supp. at 682-83.
153. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1963(e)(1) (West Supp. 1986); 21 U.S.C.A. § 853 (e)(1) (West
Supp. 1986).
154. 1984 Senate Report, supra note 5, at 196, reprinted in 1984 U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News at 3379.
155. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1963(e)(3) (West Supp. 1986); 21 U.S.C.A. § 853(e)(3) (West
Supp. 1986). Requiring witnesses to testify at a hearing "may jeopardize the safety of
witnesses or subject them to pressures which may dissuade them from testifying at trial."
1984 Senate Report, supra note 5, at 205, reprinted in 1984 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News
at 3388. For similar reasons, hearsay should be admissible at a fee-forfeiture hearing.
156. See United States v. Crozier, 777 F.2d 1376, 1383 (9th Cir. 1985).
157. The objection has been raised that a pretrial determination of title to assets is
inconsistent with the presumption of innocence that a defendant enjoys until he is con-
victed. See United States v. Mandel, 408 F. Supp. 679, 682-83 (D. Md. 1976). While
superficially appealing, the argument runs counter to well established law. "The pre-
sumption of innocence is a doctrine that allocates the burden of proof in criminal trials."
Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 533 (1979). It has no application to pretrial restraints on a
defendant's liberty or property. See id; United States v. Spilotro, 680 F.2d 612, 618 (9th
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on property, an impingement on the defendant's sixth amendment rights.
An absolute exemption of fees from forfeiture is not warranted.15 As
already noted, the particular sixth amendment right asserted-the right
to choice of counsel-is a qualified right that must be balanced against
competing interests.15 9
The Long hearing can be adapted to the task of balancing the interests
at stake in fee forfeiture. While the focus of the Long hearing is on prop-
erty rights,"6 the right to choice of counsel also hinges on property
rights. A defendant can exercise a right to counsel of his choice only if
he can afford counsel of his choice.6 In balancing the government's and
the defendant's interests, the weight of defendant's right to counsel of
choice should depend on how likely it is that the defendant truly can
afford private counsel, which depends in turn on whether the defendant
will be convicted and the assets forfeited. Likelihood of conviction will
be the element varying most from case to case and generally governing in
the balancing test.162 Hence a fee-forfeiture balancing test turns on the
inquiry into property rights made in the Long hearing.
In terms of the four factors in civil pretrial injunctions, the involve-
ment of sixth amendment rights adds an element of hardship on the de-
fendant 163 not present in cases where the deprivation is only of property.
The hardship is the potential adverse effect on the outcome of the trial.
However, the added likelihood of losing at trial as a result of the sup-
posed lesser competence of appointed counsel is not great enough to tip
automatically the balance of defendant's and government's interests in
favor of the defendant. 1 At most, it might raise the standard of proof in
the Long test. 65 At a minimum, it adds some sixth amendment weight
to the due process argument that a hearing is necessary at all.
Cir. 1982); United States v. Long, 654 F.2d 911, 916 n.8 (3d Cir. 1981); United States v.
Scalzitti, 408 F. Supp. 1014, 1015 (V.D. Pa. 1975), appeal dismissed men., 556 F.2d 569
(3d Cir. 1977); 1984 Senate Report, supra note 5, at 203, 204, reprinted in 1984 U.S. Code
Cong. & Ad. News at 3386, 3387.
158. See supra notes 68-72 and accompanying text.
159. See supra notes 68-72 and accompanying text.
160. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
161. Cf. United States v. Burton, 584 F.2d 485, 489 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (accused who is
"financially able" should not arbitrarily be denied opportunity to retain counsel of his
choosing), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1069 (1979).
162. The weight of the government interest in preserving assets, which is also the pub-
lic interest (factors 2 and 4 of the preliminary injunction standards, see supra note 150
and accompanying text), and of the hardship on the defendant (factor 3 of the prelimi-
nary injunction test, see supra note 150 and accompanying text) will not ordinarily de-
pend upon the particular circumstances of a case.
163. Factor 3 of the preliminary injunction test. See supra note 150 and accompanying
text.
164. Effect on the outcome is inherent in denial of the qualified right to choice of
counsel, but this has not prevented courts from denying counsel of choice. See supra
notes 68-71.
165. One pre-amendment decision raised this question but left it open. See United
States v. Veon, 538 F. Supp. 237, 247 n.16 (E.D. Cal. 1982). The court said in dictum
that a pretrial injunction could be modified to allow payment of legal fees and did not
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C. Standard of Proof at the Pretrial Hearing
Discussion of the standard of proof required at a fee-forfeiture hearing
should start with the standards imposed by due process in general. Just
as Long borrowed the scheme for a hearing from the civil tradition, so
too did it borrow a standard of proof. As already noted, in determining
what must be proven at the hearing, Long focused on the likelihood of
government success at trial. 66 The standard of proof followed readily:
the "government must demonstrate that it is likely to convince a jury,
beyond a reasonable doubt, of two things: one, that the defendant is
guilty of violating the [CCE] statute and two, that the profits or proper-
ties at issue are subject to forfeiture."' 67 The decision does not precisely
define what "likely to convince a jury" means; specifically, the decision
does not indicate if it means more likely than not (a preponderance stan-
dard). In essence, Long asks the hearing judge to give odds on conviction
and forfeiture, but does not explicitly say what odds justify a preliminary
injunction. The Long decision has been followed without any comment
on the apparent imprecision.168
Even assuming for simplicity that "likely to" convict means "more
likely than not" to convict, the Long standard is murky.169 Long evi-
dently requires more than the civil preponderance standard and less than
the reasonable doubt standard applied at the trial of the RICO or CCE
charges, but exactly where Long falls in between is uncertain.17 0 Like its
reach the issue of whether a higher standard of proof was required where the right to
counsel, not merely property interests, is involved. See id.
166. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
167. United States v. Long, 654 F.2d 911, 915 (3d Cir. 1981).
168. See, e.g., United States v. Lewis, 759 F.2d 1316, 1324-25 (8th Cir.), cert denied,
106 S. Ct. 406 (1985); United States v. Spilotro, 680 F.2d 612, 618 (9th Cir. 1982); United
States v. Crozier, 674 F.2d 1293, 1297-98 (9th Cir. 1982), vacated and remanded for
rehearing, 104 S. Ct. 3575 (1984).
169. See Note, Due Process in Preliminary Proceedings Under RICO and CCE, 83
Colum. L. Rev. 2068, 2094 (1983).
170. United States v. Beckham, 562 F. Supp. 488 (E.D. Mich. 1983), found the Long
standard, as outlined in United States v. Spilotro, 680 F.2d 612, 617-18 (9th Cir. 1982),
"difficult to apply with any degree of precision," 562 F. Supp. at 489, and adopted the
established standard, "clear and convincing evidence," id. at 490. "Not only is a judge
incapable of evaluating what is likely to convince a jury, but [the Long] standard. . . is
extremely cumbersome and likely to taint a later jury trial." Id. at 490.
Admittedly, the Long standard is not a model of clarity, but it is no less workable than
the traditional civil preliminary injunction standard. It is also debatable whether a find-
ing that there is clear and convincing evidence of the defendant's guilt is any less prejudi-
cial than a finding that the jury is likely to convict him.
United States v. Veon, 538 F. Supp. 237 (E.D. Cal. 1982), agreed with Long about
what was to be proved, but adopted a lower standard of proof. See id. at 248. In the
absence of procedures for criminal pretrial injunctions, Veon, rather than analogizing
from civil standards, looked to more general due process guidelines announced by the
Supreme Court in Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 756 (1982). See 538 F. Supp. at
247. The Court in Santosky, 455 U.S. at 754, indicated that the standard of proof for a
particular kind of case should be determined by the principles the Court had set forth in
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). In Mathews, a case involving administra-
tive action to deny statutory benefits, three elements were considered in determining
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older cousin, the civil preliminary injunction standard, the Long stan-
dard adds an extra layer of uncertainty to the traditional trial standards
of proof.
Further, the Long standard seems a heavy burden for the government
to meet to tie up temporarily the defendant's assets. In the civil tradi-
tion, likelihood of success at trial is only one of four elements to be con-
sidered in issuing preliminary injunctions.171 In establishing a burden of
proof, Long focused on this element to the exclusion of the other three
elements. 17 2 Long correctly emphasized probability of success at trial in
determining what is to be proven, because, of the four elements, it is the
one that will vary most from case to case.' 7 3 But the other elements'
relatively constant weight does not mean that they should be given no
weight at all in establishing a standard of proof. In the civil context, one
court noted that the "probability of success on the merits" element does
not require the moving party to prove a greater than fifty percent likeli-
hood that he will prevail on the merits if the balance of the other three
factors strongly favors him. 7 4
Accordingly, the traditional civil test has been restated as follows: A
preliminary injunction should issue "upon a clear showing of either (1)
probable success on the merits and possible irreparable injury, or (2) suf-
ficiently serious questions going to the merits to make them a fair ground
for litigation and a balance of hardships tipping decidedly toward the
party requesting the preliminary relief."'17 1 Where a defendant, if not
enjoined, may frustrate the purpose of the forfeiture statutes, and the
hardship on the defendant is merely the inability to transfer his prop-
erty, 176 satisfaction of the preponderance standard for guilt should be
sufficient to justify a preliminary injunction.
Though the Long standard of proof is too strict for cases in which
whether a challenged government procedure met the requirements of due process: 1) the
individual's interest affected by the procedure; 2) the risk of erroneous deprivation cre-
ated by the procedure; and 3) the countervailing government interest supporting use of
the procedure. See id.
Applying the Mathews test, Veon reasoned with respect to elements I and 3 that a
preponderance standard sufficed where the defendant's right to transfer his property was
pitted against the strong government interest in maintaining the court's jurisdiction over
the property. See 538 F. Supp. at 247-48. As for element 2, the court held that because
of the complexity of CCE cases, the risk of erroneous deprivation was high, and hence
this element of the Mathews test favored a standard higher than a preponderance. See id.
at 248. Despite the concern over erroneous deprivation, Peon settled on a preponderance
standard. See id
171. See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
172. See Long, 654 F.2d at 915-16.
173. See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
174. See Dataphase Sys. v. C L Sys., 640 F.2d 109, 112-13 (8th Cir. 1981) (en bane).
175. Fennell v. Butler, 570 F.2d 263, 264 (8th Cir.) (quoting Gresham v. Chambers,
501 F.2d 687, 691 (2d Cir. 1974)) (emphasis in original), cert denied, 437 U.S. 906 (1978);
see William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 526 F.2d 86, 88
(9th Cir. 1975).
176. See the analysis of the Veon court, supra note 170.
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property rights alone are implicated, it is appropriate for the fee-forfei-
ture hearing, where the right to counsel is also at stake. 177 As already
noted, the denial of counsel of choice adds the element of hardship to the
defendant 178 to the interests to be balanced. In this case, the balance of
hardships does not tip decidedly toward the government and the govern-
ment should be required to make a more convincing showing that it will
ultimately prevail at trial. 179 Hence, the Long standard of proof-taking
Long to require a preponderance of evidence that the defendant will be
convicted and forfeit his assets-is appropriate for the fee-forfeiture
hearing.
D. An Assured Fee If the Defendant Loses the Pretrial Hearing
The pretrial hearing does not completely dispose of the issues raised by
fee forfeiture. If a defendant wins, his problems of retaining counsel are
over. If a defendant loses, he has no right to defend himself with assets
the government claims, but he is still entitled to adequate counsel. 180 Af-
ter losing the hearing, the defendant is less likely than before to be able to
retain counsel. Since the defendant becomes temporarily constructively
indigent, he should be entitled to appointed counsel.' 8 '
Appointed counsel suffers from defects,'82 but it is the best the defend-
ant has the right to after losing the fee-forfeiture hearing.18 3 The best
appointed counsel would be counsel of defendant's choice.' 84 Courts
should encourage this by appointing defendant's chosen counsel and giv-
ing counsel the opportunity to earn the agreed fee. The attorney to
whom fees have been paid could be appointed and compensated at CJA
rates 85 for time actually spent. If the defendant is convicted and the
agreed fees are forfeitable, the attorney would forfeit the excess of his fee
over the CJA fee. If the defendant is acquitted or the fees are found not
to be forfeitable, the attorney would keep the full fee paid by the defend-
ant.18 6 An attorney who undertakes to represent a defendant under such
an arrangement is still subject to the ethical strains-conflict of inter-
177. See supra notes 163-65 and accompanying text.
178. See supra notes 163-65 and accompanying text.
179. In terms of the Mathews formula, supra note 170, the involvement of the right to
choice of counsel increases the risk of erroneous deprivation enough to warrant a stan-
dard higher than a preponderance. See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
180. See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
181. See supra note 74.
182. See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text.
183. See supra notes 68-72 and accompanying text.
184. Counsel of defendant's choice has been appointed in a CCE case. See United
States v. Ray, 731 F.2d 1361, 1366 (9th Cir. 1984).
185. See supra note 82.
186. The possibility of retaining the agreed fee should attract some lawyers who would
otherwise decline to work at the CJA rates. This, combined with the pretrial hearing,
should prevent Legal Aid from being inundated by RICO and CCE cases. See supra note
79 and accompanying text.
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est-described previously."8 7 The CJA fee reduces this ethical problem
by ensuring at least some fee. The potential conflict of interest resulting
from fee forfeiture, as already discussed, does not present a substantial
practical problem,188 and presents even less of a problem with the as-
sured CIA fee.
CONCLUSION
The plain language of the RICO and CCE in-personam forfeiture stat-
utes and the lack of evidence of a contrary legislative intent indicate that
the statutes reach attorneys' fees paid with illicit assets. Applying the
statutes to attorneys' fees creates conflicts with the defendant's sixth
amendment right to counsel, but the problem is not fatal to the statutes.
Modifying the statutes by requiring a pretrial hearing on fee forfeiture
provides a constitutionally sufficient safeguard of the defendant's rights.
The problem posed by the defendant who loses the pretrial hearing is
reduced by assuring his attorney a minimum fee under the CJA.
Frank McCay
187. See supra Parts II.B and C.
188. See supra notes 117-19.
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